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THE DOCTRINE OF CONSTRUCTIVE NOTICE AS
APPLIED TO CONVEYANCES OF
REAL ESTATE
A system of accurate, certain, convenient tand equitable
rules of law as to the transfer of title to real estate is of the
utmost importance not only to the parties dealing in such
property but also to the general public.
Conveyancing in Early Times
Various modes of conveyancing have been in vogue
since the dawn of history. These systems though differ-
ing widely in methods have possessed more or less similar-
ity in their essential characteristics. We find the earliest
record of a transfer of land in the twenty4hird chapter of
Genesis.
The elaborate ceremony of Mancipatio used in the early
days of Rome, wherein a transfer was effected in the pres-
ence of six Roman citizens, of full age, one of whom acted
as Libripens, or balance holder, and the other five as nec-
essary witnesses, was calculated to give dignity and pub-
licity to -the transaction and to preserve reliable evidence
of the same. Somewhat similar to Mancipatio though dif-
fering materially from it, was the method of "livery of
seisin" used by our ancestors. Neither of these transac-
tions required the perfecting evidence of a written record,
or enrollment, in order to effect the full purpose for which
they "were designed.
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Early Recording Laws
The Statute of Enrollments was passed, A. D. 1535 (27
Henry VIII. Chapt. 16). It required all conveyances by
bargain and sale of a freehold interest in land, in order to be
valid, to be made by deed,-that is, a writing under seal,-
enrolled within six lunar months after its execution in a
court at Westminster, or in the county wherein the land was
situate, by certain officers specified in said statute. This
law did not apply to conveyances by covenant to stand
seised. The statute has usually been regarded as not in
force in this country. The act provided that the title to the
land should not pass until enrollment but on and after en-
rollment, within six lunar months, the title of the bargainee
related back to the time of the execution of the deed. The
statute did not require an acknowledgment of the deed by
the bargainor. Later it was enacted that the deed should
be acknowledged by the person, or persons, who executed
it, either in court where the deed was enrolled or before the
public officer whose duty it was to make the enrollment.
In the colony of Massachusetts Bay in 1641, when the
colony had been formed into counties, an ordinance was
passed making the clerk of the county court, recorder, and
directing him to enter all grants and sales of land with the
names of the grantors and grantees and the estate granted
together with the date thereof in the records of his office.
This was to give notoriety to transfers of real estate, but
the conveyance was -not to be recorded till it was proved
that it had been .duly executed, and this was to be done by
its being acknowledged before the recording officer. The
acknowledgment authorized the recording, and recording
was to take the place of livery of seisin, as giving equal or
greater notoriety and constructive notice to all interested in
the transaction.'
What is Constructive Notice
Constructive notice is a legal inference from establish-
ed facts. The question whether under a given state of
1Pidge v. Taylor et al., 4 Mass. 541; Higbee v. Rice, 5 Mass. 344.
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facts, the law will impute constructive notice to any per-
son is not a matter for the jury to consider.2 Constructive
notice exists when the party by any circumstance whatever
is put upon inquiry, or when certain acts have been done
which the party interested is presumed to have knowledge
of on grounds of public policy. In order to give construc-
tive notice through the recording office it is necessary that
there be recorded a deed which is executed with sufficient
accuracy to transfer title. Such a deed to be recordable
must be executed and acknowledged in accordance with the
lex loci rei sitae, and the recording of a deed not executed
in conformity with the recording laws is notice to no one.'
A record, it has been said, is a "written memorial made
by a public officer, authorized by law to perform that
function, and intended to serve as evidence of something
written, said or done."
4
Legal Requisites as to Deeds
There are two 'general requisites to the validity of a
deed :-First, that it be sufficient in law on which the court
decides; Second, that certain matters of fact, as sealing and
delivery, be duly proved, on which it is the province of
the jury to determine.
As to the requirements concerning a seal we find only
three states where the law provides that a common law seal
must be attached to a deed-They are Maine, New Hamp-
shire, and Massachusetts.
A "scroll" or "scrawl" of the pen or the word "seal"
or the letter "L. S." will answer for a seal in the states of
Delaware, Illinois, North Carolina, Oregon, Vermont, Flo-
rida, Maryland, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, West Virginia,
Georgia, Michigan, New York, Virginia, Wisconsin and in
the District of Columbia.
In the thirty other states and in the territory of Alaska,
no seal nor any substitute therefor is required.
2Berdsall v. Russell, 29 N. Y. 249.
3Galpin v. Abbott et al., 6 Mich. 17.
46 Call 78; 1 Dana 595.
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The above statements only refer to deeds given, by a
private, or natural person, for in the case of a corporation.
a corporate seal should be used.
Concerning attesting witnesses to the grantors' signa-
ture, one is required by the statues in Delaware, Maryland,
Nebraska and Wyoming; while two are required in Ala-
bama, Connecticut, Michigan, Oregon, Alaska, Florida,
Minnesota, South Carolina, Arizona, Georgia, New Hamp-
shire, Vermont, Arkansas, Louisiana, Ohio and Wisconsin.
In the remaining states in, case the -deed has been duly
acknowledged no witnesses are required.
In ten states it is necessary that the acknowledgement
of a wife should be taken separate and apart from her hus-
band; they are as follows, to wit: Delaware, Louisiana,
South Carolina, Florida, North Carolina, Tennessee, Wyom-
ing, Kentucky, New Jersey and Texas.
Our system of registration in the United States is un-
known to the common law (and is essentially a creation of the
statutes; hence in order that the record of a deed may give
constructive notice both the record and the deed must be
made agreeably to statutory requirements.
In, regard to the body of the deed we find that a deed
is not invalid if in the description figures and well known
abreviations -are used.' If -an instrument is to be executed
by an attorney in fact, it should be made out in the name of
the principal and executed and acknowledged as the act of
the principal. 6
There must be certainty as to the grantee or such
words must be used as will indicate with certainty who was
intended. So a deed to the heirs of a living person is void
for uncertainty as it would be impossible in such case to
ascertain the intention of the grantor, for there is nothing
to indicate with certainty who was intended. Does it mean
heirs at law, or heirs presumptive? There seems to be no
case in which such uncertainty has been supplied by parol
5 lHarrington v. Fish et al., 10 Mich. 415.
6Fowler v. Shearer, 7 Mass. 19; Elwell v. Shaw, 16 Mass. 42.
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evidence. The intention must appear in the deed itself.'
On the other hand a deed made to the heirs of a deceas-
ed person is valid and will give constructive notice when
duly recorded for the deed gives the means by which the
grantee can be certainly ascertained8 ; and that is certain
which can be rendered certain. Certum est quod certum
reddi potest.
If a conveyance is made to a person with the middle
initial of the grantee's name omitted and he is well known
by the name used, such conveyance will be valid and upon
being recorded will give constructive notice in favor of the
grantee, for the law knows but one christiaon name.'
So a grant to Henry Earl, where his name is Robert,
was held good, he being known by both names, and a grant
to the wife of "A" is valid, he having but one wife, she is
thereby sufficiently designated."0 In a Mass. case a man by
the name of Germain. Sivris, who was also sometimes called
John Keever, signed an instrument under the name Joseph
Cyr, which name he signed by mark and this deed was duly
recorded. There was no intention to mislead anyone by the
wrong name; it was simply a mistake and the instrument
after being recorded was held valid.11 Qui haeret in litera
haeret in cortice. (He who considers merely the letter of
an instrument goes but skin deep into its meaning). A
date is not essential to the validity of an instrument of con-
veyance, as it takes effect from delivery, and even if the
date of the deed is subsequent to -that of the acknowledg-
ment it is not conclusive and may be controlled by other re-
citals in the deed. The cerbificate of acknowledgment is
presumed to be correct.2
7Hall v. Leonard et al., 1 Pick. 27.
8Shaw et al. v. Loud, 12 Mass. 447.
OGillespie et alii. v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 610; Gilbert et al. v. Stiles,
14 Peters 322.
10Hall v. Leonard, 1 Pick. 30.
11Onimet v. Sivris, 124 Mass. 162.
'2 Dressel v. Jordan, 104 Mass. 407.
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An instrument which is not acknowledged and witness-
ed (where witnesses are required) is an unrecordable in-
strument, and if placed on record does not give construc-
tive notice to anyone, although an unacknowledged convey-
ance is good between the parties to the same.'3
Concerning Acknowledgments
Acknowledgment is a proceeding provided by statute
whereby a person who has executed an instrument may by
going before a competent officer, or court, and declaring
it to be his act and deed,-entitle it to be recorded. The term
is also used to designate the certificate of the officer, or
court, showing the performance of such act. In the several
states Justices of the Peace and Notaries Public take ac-
knowledgements of deeds and in a few states a Special Com-
missioner, or some other officer, nay be designated to per-
form that act. 4 'Unless the statutes of a state require evi-
dence of the official character to accompany the official
act which is authorized, none is necessary 5
Where the name of the (grantor is not stated, or is de-
fectively stated, in She certificate of acknowledgement if it
appears from the whole instrument that it was acknowled-
ged by the grantor it is sufficent, 16  Mere false descrip-
tion does not make the instrument inoperative. Falsa dem-
onstratio non nocet, cum de corpore (persona) constat.
(False description does not injure or vitiate, provided the
thing, or person, intended has once been sufficiently descri-
bed). An officer who takes the acknowledgment may act
as one of the attesting witnesses to the signature of the
grantor," but an acknowledgment of a deed taken by an of-
ficer who is also one of the grantees named in the deed, or
'3Bogan v. Bowland, 52 Miss. 546; Cooley v. Rankin, 11 Mo. 642;
Pingle v. Dunn et al., 37 Wis. 449; Blood v. Blood, 23 Pick. 80; Cald-
well v. Head et al., 17 Mo. 561.
"See Statutes.
"5Carpenter v. Dexter, 8 Wall 513.
16Chandler v. Spear, 22 Vt. 390; Wilcoxon v. Osborn, 77 Mo. 621.
"Baird v. Evans, 53 Ga. 350.
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has some substantial interest in the granted premises, is
void. 8
The acknowledgment of a conveyance by a trustee, ad-
ministrator, guardian, or executor, who signs the same in
his fiduciary capacity, is not void because -the certificate de-
scribes him -simply by his individual name without adding
his title. 9
If the official character of the magistrate who takes
an acknowledgment appears either in the certificate of ac-
knowledgment, or as appended to his signature, the same
is valid, and it has been held that initial letters of an. offi-
cial title may be used to designate such character." Only
purchasers for value can take advantage of a defective ac-
knowledgment, and equity will interpose for the relief of
one who has taken a defective conveyance.21 When a per-
son who takes an acknowledgment does not state his official
character in his certificate, or subscription, the acknowl-
edgment is insufficient and the record of the deed irregular,
and a certified copy of it cannot be given in evidence.22
The acknowledgment by a husband who has a right
of curtesy in land owned by his wife, where the husband
and wife both join in the conveyance, is sufficient in
some states, to authorize the deed to be recorded.2-
A deed signed by the president and cashier of a cor-
poration and sealed with the corporate seal and acknowl-
edged by only one of them was held to be a sufficient ac-
knowledgment to entitle it to be recorded and to give con-
structive notice.24
If the name of the county is omitted in the caption
it is a mere informality whith does not vitiate the certi-
18Leonard v. Flood, 56 S. W. 781 (Ark. 1900); Hubbele v. Wright,
23 Ind. 322.
1ODail v. Moore, 51 Mo. 589; Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 345.
20Lessee of Livingston v. McDonald, 9 Ohio 168; Colby v. Me-
Omber, 71 Iowa 469.
22Mastin v. Halley et al., 61 Mo. 196.
22Clark v. Boyd, 2 Ohio 56.
23Palmer v. Paine, 9 Gray 56.
24Merrill v. Montgomery, 25 Mich. 76.
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ficate, it appearing sufficiently in the same that the ac-
knowledgment was taken by a proper officer.2 5
The certificate of acknowledgment of a deed made
by a Justice of the Peace de facto, is valid as 'to the parties
to the same, and it authorizes the registration upon the
public records of deeds, and such registry constitutes pub-
lic legal notice to all persons.2 6
Where a deed for land in Ohio was made in Connecti-
cut and there acknowledged before one of the Justices of
the Court of Common Pleas of the Northwestern Terri-
tory, such acknowledgement was held sufficient.27  The
registry of a deed of land executed by two persons but ac-
knowledged by one only, is notice to creditors and subse-
quent purchasers of the other and whether the grantees
were seised in joint tenancy, or as tenants in common of
the whole land, or respectivly seised of distinct parts is
immaterial.2" In case the statute of the -particular jur-
isdiction requires all the grantors to acknowledge, this
rule would probably not apply.
Defects in the certificate of acknowledgment which
are clearly clerical errors, as the misplacement of a word
or the use of the wrong date, will, not invalidate the ac-
knowledgm'ment.2" Noscilur a Sociis. (The meaning of a
word is or may be known. from the accompanying words.
It is known from its associates).
As to the Consttutionality of Certain Legislative Acts
A legislature has power in the absence of ady inhib-
iting constitutional limitations and except as against prior
vested rights, to cure by retroactive legislatibn, defective
acknowledgments of deeds, in all cases where the purpose
25Chiniguy et al. v. The Catholic -Bishop of Chicago, 41 Ill. 149.
2 6Brown v. Lunt, 37 Me. 423.
"7Kinsman v. Loomis et al. 11 Ohio 475.
28Shaw et al. v. Poor, 6 Pick. 85.
29Watkins et al. v. Hall, 57 Texas 1; Fisher v. Butcher, 19 Ohio
406; McCordin v. Billings, 10 N. D. 373; Scharfenberg v. Bishop, 35
Iowa 60.
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of the acknowledgment is the admission of the instrument
acknowledged to record, or its use in evidence. Incorrect
registration cannot avail a party who is not misled there-
by. 0 A statute which makes the record of a tax deed,
which is properly executed, prima facie evidence of the
legality of the proceedings in making the conveyance is
not unconstitutional.8 '
Is the Act of Taking an Acknowledgment a Judicial Act?
The act of taking an acknowledgment is in some
states held to be a mere ministerial act,32 hence in those
states relationshi.'p of the magistrate to one of the parties
does not disqualify him from performing the act and it
has been 'held that a Justice of the Peace may take the
acknowledgment of a mortgage running to his wife.3
The act however involves the determination of the identity
of the party appearing to acknowledge, as the one who
signed the instrument; moreover, the finding and certifi-
cate are held valid as against the unsupported testimony
of an interested party" and the Pennsylvania court holds,
with apparent reason, that the taking of an acknowledg-
ment of a deed is -a judicial act and that -the certificate of
acknowledgment in the absence of fraud is conclusive as
to the facts therein contailied8
Of the Reformation of Deeds and Correction of the Record
In an action to reform a deed on the ground of mis-
take, the lower court ordered that certain words should
be erased from the instrument and that the record of such
deed should be in like manner corrected. Held that "this
30Summers v. Mitchell, 29 Fla. 179; Gaskill v. Badge, 3 Lea
(Tenn.) 144.
31Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 345.
32Lynch et ux. v. Livingston, 6 N. Y. 422.
"3Kimball v. Johnson et. alii. 14 Wis. 674.
3 4Oliphant v. Liverside, 142 Il. 160; Calumet and Chicago Canal
and Dock Co. v. Russell, 68 Ill. 426.
"Cover et ux. v. Manway, 115 Pa. St. 338.
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was not the proper mode of reforming an instrument. The
court should have found that there was a mistake and in
what it consisted. If words had been omitted which the
parties intended to have inserted, the court should have
so found and adjudged. The court possessed no power to
order words to be erased from the deed, or to order the
Recorder of the County to change his record when he had
correctly copied the deed. As between the parties to the
record, a decree of the court ordering the reformation of
a deed is binding, and they are required to take notice
thereof, although the deed has not in fact been corrected
in accordance with the decree." 3 6
While it is true that the courts cannot supply words
to fill a blank in a certificate of acknowledgment to sus-
tain a deed, the converse of that doctrine, which is just
as unquestionably law, prohibits the supplying of words
to fill the blank to defeat the deed."' A release, assign-
ment, or extension of a mortgage made by mistake in the
margin of the record thereof may be set aside in equity.38
Constructive and Actual Notice Compared
The existence of actual notice -s a question of fact,
while on the other hand, constructive notice is a matter
of law presumed from established facts, although there is
no difference between them in regard to the legal conse-
quences. 9 The doctrine of constructive notice is a harsh
necessity, and laws which create it should always be sub-
ject to rigid construction.4"
The rules of equity as to constructive notice are
not changed by the statutes in relation to record, or con-
structive notice through the recording office,4 and notice
36Troops v. Snyder, 47 Ind. 92.
37Hathorn v. Dawson, 79 Ill. 108.
3 8Bruce v. Bonney, 12 Gray 107.
3 9Tufts v. King, 18 Pa. St. 157; Bradbury v. Falmouth, 18 Me. 65;
McMeehan v. Griffin, 3 Pick. 149; Knap v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195.
4 Call et al. v. Hastings, 3 Cal. 179.
4 lBorland v. Peoria, 16 IMi. 588.
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in other ways will be imputed when it is a reasonable and
just inference from known facts.42
As to the Record
A conveyance is considered as recorded at the time
noted thereon by the recording officer as having been re-
ceived for record,43 and a deel may be recorded before
delivery.44 The recording of a deed in Massachusetts is
conclusive presumption of delivery in favor of purchasers
for value, without notice, who claim thereunder.
If a deed of real estate is acknowledged before the
Register of Deeds and handed to him to be recorded and
at the same instant a creditor of the grantor attaches the
real estate, the attachment has the priority, inasmuch as
the deed cannot be placed on record without a certificate
of the acknowledgment, and some time must elapse before
the certificate can be written out.45
A grantee finding a good title in his grantor is not
bound by the record of conveyances outside -his line, or
chain, of title, and it is not exactly true that the recording
of a deed gives constructive notice "to all the world."4 6
The contrary opinion of the Louisiana court seems unreas-
onable.
7
When the statutes require a lease of land to be re-
corded if the term of the lease is seven years, or more, a
lease of land made to commence in futuro must be acknowl-
edged and recorded, if it is to endure more -than seven
years from the making thereoef. 8
While the record gives constructive notice to a pur-
2Pomeroy v. Stevens, 11 Met. 244; Dooly v. Walcott. 4 Allen 406;
Jackson v. Elston, 12 Johns. 425.
4'Gillespie et alii v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 610; Tracy v. Jenks, 15
Pick. 465.
44Parker v. Hill et alii., 8 Met. 447.
45Sigourney v. Lamed, 10 Pick. 72.
4 6Carbine v. Pringle, 90 Ill. 302; Maul v. Rider, 59 Pa. St. 171;
Corbin v. Sullivan, 47 Ind. 356; Crockett v. Maguire, 1 'o.. 34; Gar-
ber v. Gianelle. 98 Cal. 527.
4 7Hollingsworth v. Wilson, 32 La. Ane. 1012.
8 Chapman v. Gray, 15 Mass. 439.
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chaser, whether seen or 'not, and it is immaterial whether
such person have actual notice,49 still the record is not
notice of any fraud that may have been perpetrated in the
execution of any conveyance,5" nevertheless a purchaser
must look to all parts of the record and not content him-
self with so -much as will by itself give him no notice, when
the remainder contains statements which would jut him
upon further inquiry, 1 but when a deed of land from a
person who has no title to the same is placed on record -the
true owner is not charged with notice, that such a con-
veyance has been made.52  The recording of a paper not
required to be recorded, and not entitled to be placed on
record does not create constructive notice. 3
A duly recorded -deed purporting to convey the whole
land or estate by one or more of several joint tenants, or
tenants in common, of said land, does not give constructive
notice to the remaining co-tenants of the existence of such
deed and of the claim of the grantee to oust them of their
legal seisin in the land.54
As to records or entries on the margin of the record,
if the recording officer neglects to make cross references
between certain records as required by law this is imma-
terial, the law is directory and if the requirement is ne-
glected it does not invalidate the record.5
When a paper is left at a recording office, but not
left for record, it gives no constructive notice56 and the
filing of an unrecorded conveyance among the papers in a
suit is not constructive notice of its existence to one not a
49Peck v. Conway, 119 Mass., 546; Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich.
162.
5"Godbold v. Lambert et aiii., 8 Rich (S. C.) 155.
5 Carter v. Hawkins, 62 Texas 397.
52Bates v. Norcross, 14 Pick. 224.
"First African Methodist Episcopal Society v. Brown, 147
Mass. 296.
54Roberts v. Morgan, 30 Vt. 320; Leach v. Beattie, 33 Vt. 195.
55Hayden et alii v. Peirce, 165 Mass. 359; Chase v. Bennett,
58 N. H. 428.
5 6Hunt v. Allen, 73 Vt. 322.
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party.5  When an execution is extended upon land the
officer's return, upon the writ should be deposited with the
clerk, in order, to complete the title so that the return
can be admitted in evid~nce.
58
Is the Index a Part of the Record
As to whether the index in -the recording office is a
part of the record there -is a difference of opinion. In a
Wisconsin case where the record by mistake gave the
wrong number of a lot mortgaged, and the index of the
record gave the correct one, -it was held that "the index
gave constructive -notice of the proper description and
placed a lien on the dot really mortgaged."59  This decis-
ion would make the index of as much importance as the
extended record which does not seem reasonable. The
index is for the convenience of the public in searching the
records -and is not designed to be a part of the official
record. The records are indexed, in most oases, in sev-
eral different ways and it might -indeed be possible that
one item of the index out of several would give the correct
description, while the record and all the other items of'rthe
index were wrong, but jaccording to this Wisconsin decis-
don constructive notice would be given in such a case as
to the property really conveyed. Indeed a person might
find the record without the use of the index. We think
the better opinion is that the index -is no part of the rec-
ord and does not give constructive notice.
Conclusios
Constructive alotice is for the benefit of the public
as well as for the parties to a conveyance, and it
would seem that public policy would call for a cor-
rect record, but the courts in many states hold that as a
5 Ward v. League, 24 S. W. 986.
5 Welsh v. Anderson, 135 Mass. 65.
"9Shove v. Larsen et al., 22 Wis. 142; but see Chatham v. Brad-
ford, 50 Ga. 327.
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deed is considered to be recorded as soon as a note is
made on the instrument by the recording officer "that the
same has been received for record," it matters not that af-
terwards the officer fail to do his" duty in copying the in-
strument incorrect]r or by omitting portions of it or even
altogether neglecting to copy the deed into the record
book. These courts hold in such cases of erroneous copy-
ing, or of failure to copy, that the parties to the deed, or
other instrument, have the full benefit of the recording
laws the same as though the instrument had been copied
in full and that the whole world has constructive notice of
the full contents and tenor of such instrument left for rc-
ord, 60 while as a matter of fact they neither have notice
nor have they at their command the data from which they
may acquire notice. What the statutes mean as to the in-
strument being consdered as recorded at the time received
for record is probably, that when a permanent copy of
the same exists in the recording office the record dates as
of the time the paper is received for record. So if the
instrument remains in the recording office till fully and
completely copied there is from the time of the receipt of
the same, either the instrument itself, or a complete copy
thereof in the office for the use of the public. As will be
seen, in this view of the law, the instrument -itself serves the
purpose of the record till copied.
In the case of a mortgage where the amount copied
in the record was less than the full amount of the mort.-
gage, the public were charged with constructive notice to
the full extent and tmount of the mortgage,61 and where
a conveyance was transcribed into the wrong book the rec-
ord was still held to give constructive notice.62 These opin-
ions do not appear to conform to the maxim. Salus Populi
Suprema Lex. (The welfare of the people is the supreme
law) nor with the maxim, De non apparentious, et non
60Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. 593; Throckmorton et al. v.
Price et al., 28 Texas 605; Gillespie v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 610.
61Mims v. Mins, 35 Ala. 23.
6 2Clader et al. v. Thonas et al., 89 Pa. St. 343.
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existentibus, eadem est ratio (As to things not apparent,
and those not existing, the rule is the same.
The law as to constructive notice is a harsh neces-
sity,6 consequently it should not be made to apply too
strictly and so as to extend it beyond what the records ac-
tually show, 64 in fact only so far as the land is aptly or in-
telligibly -described therein, 5 and that a mortgage of land
erroneously recorded in the wrong book should not give
constructive notice to a subsequent purchaser of the
land, 6  nor that the record of a mortgage when made for a
less amount than it is given to secure should give construc-
tive notice of the larger amount.
s
1
On the principle that the record -of a defective ac-
knowledgment, or unduly witnessed instrument should not
give constructive notice, 68 it would appear that the Michi-
gan court recognized the correct doctrine when it held that
'.an equitable construction cannot be put upon the record-
ing laws when they are made to embrace cases not within
them, or by means of which they may be made to give con-
structive notice of things the records do not show.
6 s9
Furthermore, if by such holding a party to a convey-
ance appears to be injured he still has -his appropriate legal
remedy.
While the law as to the construction of deeds is that
where the intention can be discovered the court will carry
the same into effect if possible,") there is also that more
exacting rule Verba ehartarum fortius accipiuntur (The
words of charters, or deeds, are to be received more strong-
68Call et al. v. Hastings, 3 Cal. 179.
6 4McLouth et al. v. Hunt et al., 51 Texas 115.
6 5Wait v. Smith, 92 Il. 385.
6 6Cady v. Parser et al., 131 Cal. 552.
6 7Farrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309; Frost v. Beckman, 1
Johns Ch. 288.
6 SLessee of Heister v. Fortner, 2 Binney 40; Parrott et alii v.
Shaubhut et alii., 5 Minn. 323.
6 9 Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich. 162.
70Bridge v. Wellington, 1 Mass. 226.
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ly against the grantor)."' Applying this principle to the
recording officer, should not the words of the record be
received more strongly against him?
With the exception of two or three states our system
of recording conveyances is what may be called the county
system. In a few New England states the town system
is in vogue. Both have their advantages and their disad-
vantages, the enumeration of which would hardly be with-
in the scope of 'a paper on constructive notice. It may not
be out of place however to suggest that -a combination of
the two methods might produce results which would
have a tendency to lessen the harshness of the
,doctrine of constructive notice. This could easily
be done by requiring that the record made by the
county recorder be a printed record, in which ease a copy
of each record might -be sent to the clerk of -the municipal-
ity in which the real estate is located -or use and preserva-
tion in his office. A copy might also be deposited for like
purposes in the office of -the Recorder of the Land Court,
in -hose states that have adopted the Torrens system of
land registration. This method would bring the Land
Court into more intimate relation with the land records
which would seem to be desirable. Another advantage
would be attained ,in the increased security of the land rec-
ords from the inestimable loss which not infrequently re-
sults from their destruction by fire or otherwise, for in
case one set of records were destroyed there would be du-
plicate sets which could be used in their place. Then, too,
as the destruction of the records in such cases would cause
but slight damage there need be no expensive fire proof
buildings (so called) in which to house them.
Would it not also be possible, and advantageous, to
unite the deeds and probate offices and thus bring all rec-
ords of land transfers into one office?
Should it be desirable to unite the Probate and Land
Courts this could 'easily be done as the procedure in the
"'Adams v. Frothingham, 3 Mass. 361; Worthington v. Hyler,
4 Mass. 205.
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two courts is somewhat similar. Then encourage the re-
cording of land titles by making the expense of the same
as reasonable as possible, and finally bring all records as
to land titles under the Torrens system.
In order that the law as to constructive notice may
not work ;hardship, and that the best results may be ob-
tained from the methods designed to create notice, it would
seem that the recording laws should be such as to extend
to a reasonable degree the notice which the records actually
give.
ROBERT WORTHINGTON LYMAN
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HARKNESS v. ADAMS
Negotiable Instruments Act-Section 57-Holder in Due Course
OPINION OF THE COURT
INGRAM, J. From the facts of this case we gather that the
promissory note in question, is in the hands of Harkness, who is an
innocent holder for value, of the note after its maturity; and that
he received the note from Harris, purchaser for value and without no-
•tice of a fraud, and holder of the note before maturity Harkness
then brings an action of assumpsit against Adams, the maker of the
note.
As this is a negotiable note we must first consider the Negotia-
ble Instrument Act of May 16, 1901 P. L., 202 Sect. 57, which reads:
"A holder in due course holds the negotiable instrument free from
any defects of title of prior parties among themselves, and may en-
force payment of note for full amount thereof against all parties li-
able thereon."
From this act it seems that if Harkness is a holder of note in due
course he can recover. Under the Act of May 16, 1901 to become
a holder in due course, four conditions are essential. (1) Note must
be complete and regular on its face; (2) Holder must have received
note before it became overdue and without notice that it had been
previously dishonored; (3) In good faith and for value; (4) That at
time it was negotiated to him he had no notice of any infirmity in in-
strument or defect in title of person negotiating it. Reviewing the
facts of this case, we find that Harkness does not meet with the sec-
ond requirement because he received the note after maturity. Hence
Harkness cannot recover as a holder in due course.
Now the next question which presents itself is whether he can re-
cover as a holder of note other than a holder in due course.
Act May 16, 1901 P. L. 202, Sect. 58, reads: "In hands of any
holder other than a holder in due course, a negotiable instrument is
subject to same defenses as if it were non-negotiable; but a holder
who derives his title through a holder in due course and who is not
himself a party to any fraud or illegality, affecting instrument, has
all rights of such former holder in respect to all parties prior to lat-
ter."
If this note is to be regarded on same fooling as a non-negotiable
note then Harkness cannot recover because it is declaratory of exist-
ing law that "The holder of a non-negotiable instrument takes it sub-
ject to equities subsisting between original parties at time of trans-
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fer." Cases to support this doctrine are Edgar v. Kline, 6 Pa. 327;
Thompson v. McClelland, 29 Pa., 475; Howie v. Lewis, 14 Super. 232.
The case of Snyder v. Riley states "An indorsee of an overdue
note takes it exclusively on credit of endorser and subject even with-
out proof of mala fides, to all intrinsic considerations which would
affect it between original parties.
This doctrine is also laid down in Haldeman v. Bank of Middle-
town, 28 Pa. 440; McCruden v. Jones, 173 Pa. 507.
A person who takes a bill or note after it is due, takes it sub-
ject to all objections in respect to want of consideration or illegality,
and all other objections and equities affecting the instrument itself
and to which it was liable in hands of the person from whom he takes
it. Peale v. Addiers, 174 Pa. 549.
Riorden for plaintiff.
Fanseen for defendant.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Assuming, as did the learned court below, that Harris was a
bona fide holder for value, we are constrained to reverse .+he decision
in this case. Sec. 28 of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument law
provides that "a holder who derives his title through a holder in due
course and who is not himself a party to any fraud or illegality af-
fecting the instrument, has all the rights of a holder in due course."
Harkness derives his title through a holder in due course, Harris, and
was "not a party to any fraud or illegality affecting the instru-
ment.'
The fact that the note was indorsed to Harkness after maturity
is immaterial. A person to whom a note is negotiated after matur-
ity takes it subject to those defenses only which were available against
the negotiator. "He stands in the negotiator's shoes and is invested
with such rights as the latter may have had.' 4 A. & E. Encyc. 314,
Wilson v. Mechanics Savings Bank, 45 Pa. 488; Riegel v. Cunning-
bam. 9 Phila. 177; 7 Cyc. 789; Leidy v. Tammany, 9 Watts, 353, "Where
a party acquires paper after maturity from a bona fide holder, who
took it before maturity for a valuable consideration, he is to All intents
and purposes himself a bona fide holder. 7 Cyc. 939; Bigelow on Bills
and Notes 253. Judgment reversed.
STAPLES v. HENDRICKS
Admissibility of Evidence of Character in Civil Action of Assault and
Battery
STATEMENT OF FACTS
Civil action for assault and battery. Staples offered to prove
that Hendricks had been in forty assaults and batteries during the
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past year, having quarreled with nearly every man of his own age
in the borough for the purpose of corroborating the allegation that
Hendricks struck Staples, and that no provocation for the striking
was given by Staples. The court admieted the evidence. Hendricks
asks for a new trial.
McKone for the plaintiff.
Massinger for the defendant.
OPINION OF THE COURT
PANNELL, J. This was a civil action for assault and battery
brought by Staples against Hendricks. The plaintiff in order to cor-
roborate the allegation that Hendricks struck him and that no provo-
cation for the striking was given, offered to prove that defendant,
Hendricks, had been in forty assaults and batteries during the past
year, having quarreled with nearly every man of his age in the bor-
ough. Hendricks now seeks a new trial because this evidence was
admitted.
The questions which arise are whether this evidence of character
can be received as ompetent in a civil action and whether it can be
admitted where there was no provocation for the act, thus either ag-
gravating or mitigating the damages. We believe that the main ob-
ject and purpose of this disputed testimony was to enable the plaintiff
to aggravate his damages.
The general rule of evidence is that in civil actions evidence of
the character of either parties, except where their character is direct
ly in issue, is not admissible. Greenleaf on Evidence, Vol. 1, page 41.
In Pennsylvania, we find the courts invariably hold, that the moral
character of a person is not relevant in determining the question of
whether such person did or did not do a particular act. American
Fire Ins. Co. v. Hazen, 110 Pa. 530; Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424; An-
derson v. Long, 10 S. & R. 55; Atkinson v. Graham, 5 Watts 424. In
Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424, we find "that the defendant's good char-
acter would have been legitimate evidence in his favor upon the trial
of an indictment for assault and battery with which he was charged,
and it is somewhat difficult to perceive why it should be received in
the one case and excluded in the other, but such is the well settled
rule and unless it is manifestly wrong, ought not to be disturbed. It
does not follow because it is not in consonance with the rule in crim-
inal evidence that it is entirely wrong. To exclude evidence of charac-
ter in all civil suits where character is not directly in issue, makes
the result depend rather upon the character of the circumstances at-
tendant upon the transaction than upon that of the parties or either
of them." There are some civil actions which bring into issue the
character of the party or parties, either directly or indirectly and con-
sequently evidence of character is then admissible. "The putting
character in issue", says Tilghman, C. J. "is a technical expression
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and confined to certain actions from the nature of which the char-
acter of the parties or some of them is of particular importance."
(Anderson v. Long, 10 S. & R. 55). Therefore, in civil actions for
breach of promise, seduction, criminal conversation, libel and slander
and malicious prosecution, all of which put in issue either directly or
indirectly the character of the party or parties, it would seem
that it is pertinent to the issue to inquire whether the party had a
good character, for if he did not, he could anot loge it by the act of
the defendant."
In view of the decisions both in Pennsylvania and elsewhere, we
believe that the admission of the character evidence presented by the
plaintiff was error. Although there seems to be no logical
reason for the exclusion in this particular line of cases, yet it has
been adhered to continuously and still is regarded as the criterion.
Even though the evidence could not be properly admitted when
given as testimony to reflect some defect in the defendant's charac-
ter; still it remains to be settled whether in would not be of some
weight or of material importance in the assessment of damages. Will
the fact that A, has been reputed to be a man of pugnacious incli-
nations and has been in some forty assaults and batteries during the
past year, be of any benefit or cast any light upon the present issue?
Can the jury more readily and justly arrive at the proper amount of
damages because of this collateral testimony? It is undoubtedly an
equitable rule which will give to the innocent sufferer, not only just,
but even punitive or exemplary damages; likewise, a frequent breaker
of the peace and offender of the law, should be made to realize its
supreme authority and compelled to suffer accordingly. However,
in this particular case, we do not deem it proper that the collateral
acts, which happened previous to the one in question, should be given
in evidence.
In Robinson v. Rupert, 23 Pa. 523, it was held that "all circum-
stances that are sufficiently proximate to be properly regarded as
matters of provocation or excuse of the act complained of, may be
given in evidence for the mitigation or aggravation of damages gener-
ally." "Any act of provocation, at the time of the assault and
battery may be given in evidence in mitigation or aggravation of
damages." 1 Ency. of Evidence 1002; Stetler v. Nellis, 60 Barb.
(N. Y.) 524; Paul v. Bisset, 121 Mass. 170; Millard v. Truax, 84 Mich.
517. Here the acts took place over a space of one year and could
not be considered "sufficiently proximate" to nor "at the time" of
the assault and battery in issue to be admitted. However, suppose
that these othev acts were almost contemporaneous with the assault
in question, still it was error to admit the evidence. For it is the gen-
eral rule of evidence that only acts which are part of the res gestae
are admissible. 1 Cyc. of Evidence 997; Elkins, Bly & Co. v. McKean,
79 Pa. 493; Devling v. Little, 26 Pa. 502; Tyson v. Booth, 100 Mass.
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258. This res gestae is the term applied to circumstances, facts and
declarations surrounding or occompanying the principal fact in ques-
tion and which grow out of the main fact, are contemporaneous with
it and serve to illustrate its character. May we infer that these
assaults and reputation of the defendant had the remotest bearing
upon the present action? Surely the law law gives adequate reme-
dies to all those who desire them, but should the plaintiff be allowed
to increase his damages by showing some collateral acts? Certainly
this would be neither an equitable nor a logical rule and "according
to the better doctrine neither the evidence of the bad character of the
plaintiff nor the previous good character of the defendant is admis-
sible for the purpose of mitigating or aggravating the damages."
Porter v. Seiler, 23 Pa. 424; Bruce v. Priest, 5 Allen (Mass.) 100;
Corning v. Cornign, 6 N. Y. 97.
Therefore, it was error for the court to admit character evidence
of defendant because it was contrary to all established rules of evi-
dence in civil actions. Even if it was presented to assist in the as-
sessment of daamges or to aggravate the same, it was also improper
because it violates another general and well established rule that
evidence of character is inadmissible in the mitigation or aggrava-
tion of damages. Furthermore, these previous assaults were separate
and distinct acts, being collateral to the assault and battery in issue
and not part of the res gestae.
For these reasons, a new trial is granted.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The effort was to show a habit of striking, or a tendency to strike
others, on the part of Hendricks, in order to make more likely, or
less unlikely, his having committed the alleged assault on Staples,
without provocation from Staples.
That a habit of doing a thing makes the doing of it, on a partic-
ular occasion, less difficult to believe, cannot be doubted. However,
evidence of a habit is excluded; Baker v. Irish, 172 Pa. 528, for no
better reason than that one had done a thing before "would warrant
no inference, or one so remote, that he had done the same" on the
day in question.
A habit consists of repetitions of an act, or of the tendency, form-
ed or at least strengthened by repetitions, to do the act again. Here the
offer is to show not a habit, possibly, but forty assaults and batteries.
If habit cannot be shown, neither can the several acts, whose repeti-
tion forms the habit. The conclusion of the learned court below is
therefore approved. Affirmed.
DICKINSON LAW REVIEW 169
HENDRICKS v. CHARLES ADAMS
Promissory Note-Section 63 of Negotiable Instruments Act-Neces-
sity of Presentment to Bind Endorser
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A firm composed of Henry and Charles Adams made a promis-
sory note to Hendricks, but before delivering it to Hendricks, en-
dorsed the note in their individual names. The firm not paying the
note at maturity, notice of default was promptly made to each of the
endorsers by Hendricks who brings this suit on the endorsement
against Charles Adams.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BONIN, J. According to the act of 1901, a negotiable promis-
sory note is an unconditional promise in writing made by one per-
son to another signed by the maker engaging to pay on demand, or
at a fixed or determinable future time, a sum certain in money to or-
der or to bearer. The promissory note in this case has a slight
anomaly which alters the relationship of the parties considerably. The
said firm members endorsed the note thus bringing themselves under
the 29th Sec. of the act of 1901, i. e. the assumption of the liabilities
of an accommodation party. The question then arises, whether the
payer was vindicated in bringing this action against one of such en-
dorsers ?
The counsel for the defendant contends, first, that the makers
should have first been charged to the extent of their assets, and sec-
ond, inadequacy of presentment. Let us consider these two objectionA,
Sec. 44 of the act of 1901 states that where any person is under
an obligation to indorse in arepresentative capacity, he may endorse
in such terms as to negative personal liability. In the case at bar, the
firm was under no obligation to endorse, but doing so their liability
becomes personal. Having therefore signed in such capacity Charles
become likewise an irregular endorser liable to the payee and all
subsequent parties, sec. 64.
Second, was presentment necessary and was it satisfactory in this
case? It seems somewhat preposterous to claim that the makers here-
in were not sufficiently informed of the default. Of course. they
were not notified as a unit firm, but did they not each receive suffi-
cient notification when they were informed individually. Since both
the endorsers were the parties to the firm why cannot we say that
the holder was justified in doing what he did, thus binding the said
parties.
In Foster v. Collner, 107 Pa. 305; Kerr's Estate, 17 Pa. C. C. R. 193,
the liability is held equal. An endorser might be proceeded against
by the holder and then the former might bring an action against the
maker.
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Analogous cases hold "that an irregular endorsement by the pres-
ident of the maker corporation makes him liable to the payee per-
sonally and individually. Birmingham Iron Co. v. Regner, 10 North.
Co. 205; s. c. 2 Legh. Co., 88, 1906.
Act of 1901, Sec. 81, says that presentment is not required in or-
der to charge an endorser where the instrument was made or accepted
for his accommodations and he has no reason to expect that the instru-
ment will be paid if presented.
Contending then that presentment was not necessary and the
maker need not be charged primarily we think that the plaintiff's
action must be sustained.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
Prior to the enactment of the Uniform Negotiable Instrument
Law, there was great conflict among the authorities as to the liabil-
ity of one, neither maker or payee, who endorsed a note before de-
livery to the payee. 7 Cyc. 664. The liability of such a person has
been variously held to be that of (1) a maker; (2) endorser; (3) sure-
ty; (4) guarantor. 7 Cyc. 664. In Pennsylvania a destructive doc-
trine was adopted by which such person was liable as a "second en-
dorser." Central Nat. Bank v. Dreydoppel. 134 Pa. 499; 7 Cyc. 666.
See especially Stewart's Purdon, Vol. 3, page 3281-2 and notes.
Section sixty-three of the act of nineteen hundred and one, which
is a section of the uniform act provides: "Where a person not other-
wise a party to an instrument places thereon his signature in blank
'before delivery, he is liable as an endorser in accordance with the fol-
lowing rules: (1) If the instrument is payable to the order of a third
party, he is liable to the payee and to all subsequent parties; (2) If
the instrument is payable to the order of the maker or drawer, he is
liable to all parties subsequent to the maker or drawer; (3) If he
signs for the accommodation of the payee he is liable to all parties
subsequent to the payee."
Construing this section it has been uniformly held that such per-
son is liable, when liable at all, only as an endorser and as such can-
not be held unless there has been presentment, demand and notice.
See cases collected 14 L. R. A. N. S. 842.
The defendant in this case was an anomalous or irregular endor-
ser, i. e. he was a person, not otherwise a party to the instrument who
had placed thereon his signature in blank before delivery, and his
liability is therefore to be determined by the provisions of the sec-
tion of the statute quoted. "Construing with accuracy the crucial
words of this section, a person who as an individual, endorses a prom-
issory note is 'not otherwise a party' to that instrument, because lia-
ble thru membership in a firm whose name appears as maker. In the
sense in which the word 'party' is used (in the statute) the partner-
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ship which makes the note is the party liable as maker, altho there
may flow as a subsidiary inference of law an individual liability of
each partner in default of firm assets. In this aspect and for this
purpose the partnership may be treated as personified and as an en-
tity separate from the individuals who compose it" Fourth Nat.
Bank v. Mead, 216 Mass. 521; 104 N. E. 377; See also Faneiul Bank
v. Melon, 183 Mass 66.
The law presumes that the defendant endorsed the instrument for
value, (see sec. 24, act of 1901) and therefore under the first clause
of section sixty-three of the act of nineteen hundred and one, he was
liable to payee as an endorser.
As a general rule presentment for payment and demand are es-
sential to fix the liability of an endorser of a negotiable instrument.
7 Cyc. 959. The seventieth section of the act of nineteen hundred and
one provides: "Except as herein otherwise provided presentment for
payment is necessary -to charge the endorsers." The present case is
not embraced within any of the exceptional cases and therefore to
bind the endorser, presentment should have been made.
To hold. that the plaintiff cannot recover in this action works no
great hardship. He may sue the partners jointly and, recovering
judgment, he may levy upon the separate property of each. On the
other hand if the plaintiff is allowed to recover in this action, the only
right of the defendant against his partner will be to sue for contribu-
tion. If, however, the plaintiff is compelled to sue both partners
as makers and the present defendant pays the judgment, he would
be entitled to be subrogated to the judgment as a means of enforc-
ing his right to contribution. Judgment reversed.
FLECK v. INSURANCE COMPANY
Fire Insurance-Stipulations in Policy Not to Keep Certain Arti-
cles on Premises
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The policy on Fleck's property stipulated that it was to be void
if he kept benzine et cetera on the premises. For the space of one
year, he kept benzine on the premises for sale, but two years before
the fire he ceased to do so. He paid an annual premium to keep
alive the policy. At the end of the two years the fire occurred
which occasioned this suit. The defendant alleges that the insur-
ance became, and continued ever after void, by reason of the keep-
ing of the benzine on the premises.
Marshall for the plaintiff.
McKone for the defendant.
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OPINION OF THE COURT
PIFER, J. This suit was brought on a fire insurance policy to
recover for the loss caused by fire, and the defense is that the keep-
ing of benzine on the premises two years before the fire avoided the
policy.
The question is whether the policy was rendered void because
benzine, one of the prohibited articles enumerated therein, was kept
on the premises during the life of the contract. The policy was in
full force at the time of the fire unless avoided by what occurred in
the meantime. The plaintiff paid the annual premiums to keep
alive the policy until the fire occurred and they were accepted by
the defendant company without objection. Another question is
whether the policy was rendered void or only suspended during the
time the benzine was kept on the premises. Upon this question there
is a conflict of authority, but the weight of decisions is against ab-
solute forfeiture, and in favor of the doctrine that the policy, al-
though suspended during the time the prohibited articles are kept on
the premises, may be revived by a discontinuance of the keeping or
use of such prohiibted articles. Upon this question we cite Sum-
ter Tobacco Warehouse Co. v.Phoenix Ins. Co., S. C., 56 S. E. 654,
10 L. R. A. U. S. 741, and Troder's Ins. Co. v. Cotlin, 163 Ill., 256.
When a prohibited article had been kept or used on the insur-
ed premises, but the insurer had not declared a cancellation or for-
feiture of the policy on that account, the following cases are au-
thorities for the doctrine that if the breach is merely temporary,
the effect thereof is only to suspend the policy during the breach,
and not to forfeit it absolutely. Crete Farmers' Mut. Twp. Ins.
Co. v. Miller, 70 Ill. App. 599; Mutual Fire Ins. Co. v. Coatesville
Shoe Factory, 80 Pa., 407; Mears v. Humbold Ins. Co., 92 Pa. 15;
Bentley v. Ins. Co., 191 Pa. 276; Silver Plate Co. v. National Fire
Ins. Co., 170 Pa. 155; Krug v. German Fire Ins. Co., 147 Pa. 272.
In McClure v. Mutual Fire Ins. Co., 242 Pa. 59, we find a case
in which the facts are similar to the one at bar, and it was held
that "under these circumstances it is our conclusion, that the pol-
icy was not rendered absolutely void by what occurred, but was only
suspended during the time the prohibited articles were kept on the
premises, and that it was revived by a discontinuance of the prohib-
ited use and by the payment of premiums and the issuance of re-
newal receipts after that time. * * * * If this rule has not already
been adopted in Pennsylvania, it is time that it should be; and if
anything said in our cases gives support to a different view, .the
decisions in those cases must be considered modified to the extent
herein indicated. * * * * It is our conclusion therefore that the pol-
icy had not been rendered absolutely void, but that it was in full
force and effect at the time of the fire, and that the defendant insur-
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ance company is liable according to the terms of the policy for such
loss as resulted." Judgment for plaintiff.
OPINION OF SUPERIOR COURT
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has on occasions affec-
ted a solicitude that the so-called freedom of contract of the individ-
ual should not be abrogated or abridged, and have declared statutes
unconstitutional on -the ground that they violated or abridged this
right. See Godcharles v. Wigeman, 113 Pa. 431; Walters v. Wolf,
162 Pa. 153.
In spite, however, of the general and emphatic asseverations of
the courts in these and other cases, it is not a universal principle
that any contract which persons may choose to make must be en-
forced by the courts. In a very large number of cases of varying
facts and circumstances, the courts have refused, for various rea-
sons, to enforce contracts which parties have made. See 18 D. L.
R. 91.
Should the court do so in this case? The policy stipulated that
upon a certain contingency, which is admitted to have occurred, it
should be void. The term void has been thus defined: absolutely
null; without legal efficacy; ineffectual to bind parties; that which
is incapable of enforcement and cannot be ratified or confirmed; of
no legal effect, etc. 40 Cyc. 214. See also Pearsoll v. Chapin, 44
Pa. 15; Seylar v. Carson, 69 Pa. 87.
It is clear that if in the present case the word is to be so i1rr
terpreted, the plaintiff is not entitled to recover. Is the word to
be so interpreted? The authorities are in conflict. Many courts
bold that in cases like the present the word is to be so interpreted
and that therefore the removal of the situation constituting the
breach of the condition does not operate to revive the policy. 19 Cyc.
709. Other authorities equal in number and force hold that the
term means only "voidable" and that under this interpretation the
policy revives when the cause of forfeiture no longer exists. 19 Cyc.
710; 10 L. R. A. N. S. 741.
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has recently adopted the
latter view. McClure v. Ins. Co., 242 Pa. 59. It is true that from
the report of this case it does not appear that the policy stated that
upon a breach of the condition it should be void, but the court quo-
ted with approval a number of cases in which, in spite of such con-
dition, it was held that the policy revived upon the cessation of the
wrongful user. Furthermore it is a fair assumption that the policy
was of the standard form, which expressly provides that the pol-
icy shall be void if the conditions are broken.
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In holding that the term void does not mean void, the court
was not without authority. See Election Cases, 65 Pa. 34. Mull-
er's Est., 16 Phila. 321.
Though we are inclined to the opinion that this is a case in which
persons who are sui juris should "not be prevented from making
their own contracts", we yield to the authorities cited and affirm
the judgment of the learned court below.
